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SUMMARY.
This paper explores at a broad macro level the sources of economic
growth of South Africa since the Second World War. Economic growth is
distinguished from economic development and is defined as a sustained
increase in real per capita incomes. It is argued that such a per
capita income rise will result, on the whole, in an increase in the
range and quantity of goods and services consumed and enjoyed by
individual members in a society, and hence is a desirable long term
goal. Historically economic growth in almost all industrialized
countries has led to an improvement in living standards - again a
desirable objective. Attention is paid to the process of economic
growth in general and to international comparisons.
The intention is to stimulate discussion and to suggest that the
previous debate revolving around apartheid or capitalism as either the
hero or the villain is too narrowly focussed. This paper rejects both
the capitalist and the neo-marxist theoretical framework and argues
for an empirical Benthamite utilitarian approach, which is goal
orientated ready to draw on a variety of methods and institutional
structures likely to engender maximum rates of economic growth , but
compatible too with a more equal distribution of income than is
presently the case. Particular emphasis is placed on access to
property and the openness of the economy enabling complete moibility
of the factors of production.
The paper works within a thirty year time framework, circa 1945 to
circa 1975. Empirical and statistical evidence and cross country
comparisons suggest a highly complex interplay of political and
economic factors in generating economic growth. The phasing of growth
within business cycles is examined. South Africa has been part of the
international economy and hence exogenous growth factors show both the
vulnerability to and the challenge offered by the international
connection. Foreign investment, trade flows, access to foreign
technology and innovation and the flow of labour supplies across
national boundaries are explored as possible sources of growth. Within
South Africa our starting point is the factors of production.
Endogenous growth factors reflect in the savings and investment levels
< all aspects of capital), the age profile, the quality and supply
levels of the labour force < the labour component), and _the related
achivement of productivity-based growth gains and the resource base of
the economy (broadly interpreted as the land element) are discussed.
A major section of this paper deals with the role of the state in the
S A economy-both positive and negative, in the growth process. Here
the net is thrown wide to examine the state as an active investor and
as a passive guarantor of capital and economic stability, both as
re-distributive agents vis-a-vis income, as a promoter of the possibly
dysfunctional dual economy. The growth implications of investment by
the state in strategic and military structures is briefly commented
upon. Anomalies in the state views and policies relating to economic
growth are apparent.
The paper examines constraints upon S A economic growth and the major
points of dispute and debate In analysis of growth . At times it is
not always easy to separate cause from consequence, or a situation
where the manifestation of growth in one period, becomes the basis for
further growth in the next period. The conclusion attempts to identify
possible future pro-growth economic approaches.
INTRODUCTION
"A new South Africa is possible only if it is bolstered by a sound
and growing economy, with particular emphasis on the creation of
employ employment The central message is that South Africa , too,
will have to make certain structural changes to its economy. . . . In this
process, preference has to be given to allowing the market farces and
a sound competitive structure to bring about the necessary
adjustments.
F W De Klerk, 2nd Feb.,1990.
Economic growth Is a fundamental Issue for social scientists for it is
central to the question of wealth creation and wealth distribution.
Implied in the exploration of the causes of economic growth in the
past is the hopes that the identification of such sources will
indicate an appropriate growth path that can be followed in order to
generate an ideal or maximum growth rate in the future. Economists
argue that cross country comparisons of past growth patterns will
possibly yield formulae for developing nations, enabling such
countries to emulate their more "advanced" neighbours in the global
village. The decriptions of "developed",. "developing",
"underdeveloped" . "undeveloped" have meaning only in relation to the
concept of economic growth and the characteristics of that growth. It
is a Western thought construct that makes the fundamental assumption
that economic growth is a desirable goal, not only as a end in itself
but as a means to another even more elusive but valued objective- a
better ordered society in which the material wants of all are met.
There is an implicit and perhaps nailve belief that economic growth
by its very nature will lead to the fairer distribution of the fruits
of productive labour, greater well-being, the elimination of poverty
and the eradication of material want. A rising and acceptable standard
of living will be the end product. Economists are seldom
philosophers, but this simple belief in economic growth as a "good
thing" is a part of the mental baggage of a belief in the
inevitability of human progress through time. The more productive,
more efficient, more cost-effective use of resources culminating in a
Benthamite objective of the greatest good of the greatest numbers is
viewed both as part of the process and the result of the experience of
economic growth. Although it has been observed that the process of
modern economic growth may well lead to increasing inequalities in
income during initial phases of development, there has -been little
discussion concerning the acceptability of a trade-off between growth
and inequality, but there are significant policy implication.
The study of economic growth is pertinent to South Africa. In 1974 a
workshop organized by social scientists, on the theme of economic
growth and political change in South Africa was held at the University
of Natal. This conference gave rise to book on essays on this theme
edited by Lawrence Schlemmer and Eddie Webster. <
 :1;, The central theme
of the book was the debate about the relationship of race and class to
the distribution of wealth. Emphasis
 :fell on the South African
worker, both white and black, as producers and as members of interest
groups and classes. Many of the contributions had a strongly
predictive character arguing either pessimistically or optimistically
as to the likely effect of economic growth on the future economic,
social and political position of the South African worker. What was
termed "the older or "conventional" viewpoint", revolved around two
key related theses, first, that economic growth was per se a
fundamental solvent of existing social and political structures and
second, that race prejudice and most particularly apartheid, was
irrational and could not survive the logic of economic rationality
which was inseparable from economic growth in a market economy, such
as South Africa. ,::s, The "revisionist thesis" postulated that the
South African economy was a labour repressive economy in which the
very process of economic growth and specifically the rapid
accumulation of capital and the high living standard of the White
working class, was made possible by the paltical machinery of
repression which assured the continued inferiority status and economic
position of the Black workers.
 C:=.:. In Fisher, Schl'emmer and Webster's
introductory essay it was argued that neither system, the market
economy nor a labour repressive economy existed outside or independent
of political structures "there is probably some kind of continuum,
which possibly also representas an historical trajectory". The book
was a major contribution to the debate that dominated the 1970s, and
the revision view, provided a fresh and original perspective by
questioning the fundamental assumptions of the liberal school. But it
is my contention that because of its strong labour orientation and the
depth of the divide between so-called liberal and revisionist social
scientists and historians, it was not possible at the time to take a
hard critical look at the evidence about economic growth and its
sources. The economists whose work was included in the book, Gavin
Maasdorp,Norman Bromberger, the late Jill Hattrass and Mike McGrath
were themselves interested in the specific labour/employment/income
differential aspects of the debate and did not focus on the broader
totality of the economy, a.
Brian Kantor and David Rees did return to many of these questions in
their study , "South African Economic Issues", applying the tools of
orthodox economics to important topics in South African economics.s
The approach was topical and discussion wide ranging. There is perhaps
a lack of unity, but the conclusions are challenging. In 1977 the
Nedbank Group Economics Unit under the leadership of Merton Dagut
produced South Africa:an appraisal.
 s Aimed at informing the overseas
investor the approach was scholarly, order and analytical and raised
essential issues about recent economic growth.
This paper poses some questions about economic growth in general,
drawing on cross-country foreign comparisons but primarily looks at
the sources of economic growth in the South African economy between
1946 and 1975, and by implication, attempts to identify likely
constraints on economic growth at a macro level. The study attempts
to differentiate between manifestations of growth and causes of
economic growth, although cause and consequence are sometimes
difficult to dls-entangle as one moves from one decade to the next.
The identification of the factors of production (land, labour,
capital, entrepreneurship), is a static description of what exists in
any economy. Our interest is in how these factors related to one
another; how they combined to induce growth over a specific time
period at a specific rate. Could that growth rate have been higher?
What were the implications of that growth for income distribution and
welfare? Much of what I have to say is tentative and suggestive and I
am well aware that it is open to debate. Hot all of what one wishes to
measure lends itself to precise quantification. Certain questions are
unanwerable because historians study what happened in the past, rather
than what might have happened! This is the start of a larger study
and I am well aware of the limitations -each paragraph needs a
chapter.
ECONOMIC GROWTH. A couple of fundamental definitions are appropriate to
demarcate guide-lines. "Economic growth" denotes, basically a
sustained increase in real per capita incomes. Historically conditions
of economic growth are a recent phenomenon far sustained growth only
became a discernable pattern in the economic performance of certain
economies in the modern period, and appeared to be associated with
changes in the structures of production, technology and rising
urbanisation, that came to be labelled as tie industrial revolution in
the Northern hemisphere. -, Temporary short-run improvements in income
did occur in earlier periods awing to bumper crops or to windfall
gains in the terms of trade, but are of little long-term
significance. Indeed the very concept of a sustained rise in incomes
over a long period of time is novel, and whereas the social scientist
frequently 'focusses on the reasons for a lack of growth, a gentle
reminder from the historian that it is the presence, rather than the
absence of economic growth that requires an explanation. In other
words, in the very long-run growth is abnormal and stagnation or
retreat is normal. Real incomes is stressed because it is advseable
to eliminate changes in the value of money and price fluctuations. Per
capita income points to the Importance of linking passible gains to
likely increases in population, which then minimise those gains.
Admittedly this standard definition says nothing about income
distribution and in South Africa the question of racial income
inequality is central to an understanding of growth. <I shall return
to this point later in this paper.)
Economists are seldom good linguists and hence there has been some
semantic confusion over the definition and the meaning of economic
growth and economic development. Development and growth are
frequently used interchangeably. But development indicates a change
in the economic structure denoting a change in the principal economic
activities, diversification away from a single sector economic
activity towards a more broadly based economy. "Structural
transformation" is the criterion used by some economists to define the
status of developed and underdeveloped countries. Simon Kuznets talks
about economic growth and structure tq differentiate between the two
processes.G, On the other hand, W V Rostow's seminal study on "The
Stages of Economic Growth" in fact concerns stages of economic
development, a In any economy a growth of incomes can occur without
structural change. Although when structural change does occur It is
usually-associated with an increase in real output' and real income per
head.
JTor is it appropriate to equate a rise in per capita incomes with an
automatic or a comensurate improvement in welfare and material
wellbeing. Per capita incomes cannot be used as an index of economic
welfare, and particularly so in cross-country comparisons. Welfare
expectations also change over time; put simply, what was once luxury
items become necessities. Material wants are infinite and urban
material priorities may differ greatly from rural requirements
(sewerage systems, street lighting, telephones for example).
Furthermore there is controversy about eliminating or at least
allowing far the social costs of economic growth; which at times may
be so grave as to nullify the beneficial gains of growth.
Marxist analysis af economic relationships between countries has
another perception of economic growth, with growth perceived as a
zero-sum game. A country can only experience economic growth if
another country is impoverished in the process. Gunder Frank's work
on Latin America presents the thesis of the development of undei—
development.1O He argues that rich first-world countries grow because
poor third-world countries are exploited; that trade is an unequal
contract and that underdevelopment is actively and positively
encouraged in dependency relationships between countries. This type of
zero-sum analysis provides an emotional underpinning for the pleas for
a New World Economic Order. The underdevelopment model has also
been applied within countries, to differentiate between rich and poor
regions. In South Africa impoverished, barren exclusively Black
settlement areas, are contrasted with the wealth of the prosperous,
thriving high income White settlement areas and the obvious seemingly
obvious conclusion is drawn: Black poverty is caused by White wealth.
SOUTH AFRICA'S GROWTH PERFORMANCE: This section discusses the
parameters and patterns of growth in South Africa. The total output
of goods and services produced in South Africa, measured in constant
1980 prices, increased from R 3 258million in 1920 to approximately
R60 000 million in 1980, equating to an average annual compound growth
rate of 5% per annum. ,. i Since population grew from 6 million to 28
million in a consistent land area (note since South Africa's
boundaries changed official statistics distort population figures),
these figures give us a real growth per capita of 2 % per annum. If
we change the time span we arrive a very similar figures; between 1933
and 1965 per capita incomes grew by 2 % (with population increasing
by about 2.3 per cent per annum and real national product growth of
approximately 5% per annum).,2
Nattrass presents the data,
decade:
 13
using 1970 as the index year by the
THE GROWTH IN SOUTH AFRICAN OUTPUT 1911-79
1911 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1979
Est.G.D.P. in (R million)
1970 prices 1 225 1 000 1947 i 170 4 434 6 722 11 839 15 474
6,9 5,0 3,4 4,3 5,8 3,1
22
18
7
14
16
9
13
13
12
18
13
18
12 '
14
21
8
10
23
8
13
25
Growth Rate -2,0
over Decade
Share Produced
by:
Agriculture 21
Mining 28
Manufacturing 4
(Source: J Nattrass: The South African Economy, 1981, p25 )
Nattrass thus calculates an annual average rate of growth of output
between 1911 and 1979 at a price constant rate of 3,8 % . Following
D Hobart Houghton's initial classification,She identifies five periods
of relative growth stagnation, namely, 1920-22; 1928-32; 1952-53; the
early 1960s; and 1974-79. During the decade, 1973 to 1982, the growth
of G D P per head at constant prices averaged only 0,79 per annum,
although there were wide variations as in four of the ten years there
was negative growth.
WJ
 If we take 1960 to 1982 as our time period
then the real G D P per head of population, puts in a better appearance
at 1,8 per cent per annum.
Structurally, there were sizeable changes in the contributions of the
three major sectors to output; with a consistent decline in the
contribution of agriculture to the G If P and a parallel growth in the
share of manufacturing, as can be seen in the table above. The
contribution of mining declined consistently until the decade of the
seventies and consequent upon the changes in the gold price and a
rennaisance in mining industry a larger percentage share was recorded
in that'decade. In the early eighties, the contribution of mining to
output reverted to a level of between 10,5 and 11,5 per cent, whilst
by 1982 the share of manufacturing at 33,0 per cent was exceeded by
that of services at 35,8 per cent.
 l s
SOUTH AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS: How have South Africa's
growth rates compared with international per capita growth rates?
Simon Kuznets' standard computations of South African per capita
product growth per annum over the time period 1911-1953 was 2,4 %.
The comparable United Kingdom per capita National Product annual
growth rate over a longer time span, 1860-1953, was 1,25%. The
United States G N P grew at a per capita annual rate of 2,03% over the
time period 1869 to 1954 . The comparable figure for Russia/USSR over
the period 1870 to 1954 was 1,54%17 Nineteen countries were studied
by Kuznets in his pioneering analysis of modern economic growth; six
of the 19 countries (Norway, Sweden, U.S.A., Canada, Japan and South
Africa) show per capita income Increases "close to, or well over, 20%
per decade", is Thus a per capita per annum increase in the region of
2% was considered high, unusual and of relatively recent origin even
in developed countries of the world prior to the Second World Var.
Such growth rates were considred to be rapid because cumulation over a
century indicated the achievement of relatively high Income levels,
but also indicate that such growth rates could not have prevailed over
more than the recent past. It was also a largely Western phenomenon.
In the 1960s during the period of the world boom South Africa's growth
rate per head was slightly below the International average, and in the
1970s having decellerated to well below 1 per cent growth per annuam
was significantly less than the average international average .
Since the Second World War per capita growth rates have been rather
higher and a greater divergence in growth rates are apparent, as is
shown in the following table:
ANNUAL RATES OF GROWTH OF PER CAPITA PRODUCT IN PERCENTAGES.
Country Time Period 1 2 3 4 5 6
Japan
Germany/W Germany
Italy
France
Sweden
Denmark
Netherlands
Norway
Belgium
United Kingdom
Australia
Canada
U. S. A.
1,6
0,7
1,6
1, 5
2, 0
1,2
1,5
2,5
1,2
0,5
0, 4
0, 8
1.5
1. 4
1,2
1,3
1, 0
3, 2
1, 3
0, 3
2,6
0,6
1, 1
1,8
1,9
1,3
8, 4
5, 0
4,8
3, 7
3,5
3, 4
3,3
3,2
3, 0
2,5
2,2
1, 9
1, 9
3,6
2,5
2, 5
1, 9
3,3
2, 0
1,3
2,8
1, 9
1,5
1, 6
1,9
1, 8
9,5
3,6
4, 6
4, 7
3,2
4, 0
4, 2
4, 0
4,2
2, 0
3,3
3. 7
3, 1
9, 9
3,5
3,8
4, 9
2,5
3,8
4,3
3,9
4,3
1, 9
3,2
3,5
2, 3
Time periods: 1 Beginning of the 20th Century to 1925-29.
2 1925-29 to 1950-54
3 1950-54 to 1963-67
4 1925-29 to 1963-67
5 1960-71 or 72
6 1965-71
Source: Moses Abramovitz: Rapid Growth Potential and Its Realisation: the
Experience of Capitalist Economies in the Postwar Period, page 33 in
Economic Growth and Resources, Vol 1: The Major Issues edited by Edmond
Malinvaud.
SOUTH AFRICA - FIRST OR THIRD WORLD COUNTRY ? By 1982 the G D P per
capita at current prices wa R 2 644 (or 32 440), and for the G N P
the figure was R 2 532 (or $2 337).
 ia Statistically this placed South
Africa among the top third of countries included in the 1981 World
Bank Atlas. With a per capita G N P one-fifth of that of the U S A
. but double that of Nigeria, the problem of accommodating South Africa
within an international classification of development models or
economy types still persists. This difficulty is hinted at in the
dilemma - is South Africa a first or a third-world country?-but in
economic terms is rather more complex than this. Dualism has
manifested itself not only in a market-orientated / subsistence
economy divide but also in the description of its modern economy both"
as a primary producer and as an exporter of manufactures. Until 1980
South African was bracketed with Australia and New Zealand, by the I M
F, as "more developed, primary producing countries". In 1980 South
Africa was reclassified as a "non-ail developing country" and further
redefined as a "major exporter of manufactures". However the Bank of
International Settlements in 1982 classified South Africa as one of
twelve,"other developed countries". Yet it is as the producer of
gold that South Africa's performance has matched that of other primary
producing countries, but the nature of the product conveys a unique
economic positioning in any international economic league table, ao
COMPARISONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE AFRICAN CONTINENT. The validity of
intra-continental African comparisons with South Africa has been
keenly debated. Once again there are problems of classification.
Is South Africa a westernized country in Africa and a likely model for
other African countries or are the differences in history, political
structures and objectives too great to make comparisons realistic?
By 1981 South Africa's population was the fourth largest in Africa
(after Nigeria, Egypt and Ethiopia). Its 1980 G N P (at market
prices) was second to that of Nigeria, but its per capita income
in 1980 at $ 2 290 was less than that of Libya ($6 640) and
Gabon (S3 680). There are vast disparities in income levels and in
income distribution both across the African continent and within
individual countries, but the reasons for differences in income levels
and growth rates in Africa are beyond the scope of this paper.
 S1
PATTERNS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: Many economists have worked on
empirical patterns of economic growth or essential development
features using cross country comparisons. J D Gould concentrates on
the roles of agriculture, capital, foreign trade, technology and the
residual in generating growth, although is discussion ranges widely
through time and across countries.as He reflects on the nature and
processes of structural change in these specific areas and stresses
that growth is not simply a question of measuring inputs against
outputs. Best known of the exponents of economic growth is perhaps
Simon Kuznets. He presents extensive empirical comparative evidence
but also reflects intelligently on the difficult or impossible to
quantify non-economic factors. He identifies a slgnficant number of
characteristics of modern economicgrowth that were common to
developed counties surveyed in his study. Interesting to note that
whilst South Africa was included in his study published in 1959,
his major work published in 1966, South Africa no longer appeared in
the empirical evidence on specific countries.a3 Amongst the factors
associated with high rates of economic growth, Kuznets identifies
substantial rates of population growth, a decline in the share of
agriculture and related activities, rises in the share of
manufacturing and public utilities, structural changes within
manufacturing production from less to more durable products and from
consumer to producer goods; and increases in the share and structure
of the service sector. Kuznets stresses that a rapid rise in per
capita product has been due to improvements in the quality of inputs,
that is an improvements in efficiency and productivity not simply of
labour but also of equipment. As gross capital formation proportions
rose a rise in the ratio of the capital stock to the labour force
accompanied it. Changes in the structure and product of the labour
force called for a capacity in the society for rapid institutional
adjustment and mobility of both capital and population. David Landes
arrived at similar conclusions in his study of technological change
and industrialization in Vestern Europe.SA It was
passible for growth ta be transmitted rapidly internationally
because of the revolution in transport and communication that had its
origins in the nineteenth century. International flows of people,
commodities and capital promotd higher rates of aggregate growth in
the receiving countries between 1850 and 1914. Hence the proportion of
overaseas trade to aggregate product rose significantly at that
tineas.
Hollis Chenery and Moises S'yrquin identify ten basic processes that
appear to be essential features of development in all countries
surveyed for the period 1950-1970. The process is further refined
by twenty-seven variables.sts These processes describe multi-
dimensionally the conduits for the overall structural transformation
of a poor country into a rich one. The process is described as one of
"structural transition ". The authors survey patterns of investment,
government revenue, education, domestic demand, the structure of
production, the characteristics of trade, the labour structure,
urbanization, demographic features and income distribution patterns.
Obviously there are qualitative differences between large and small
countries. Their objective is to show how resources are "accumulated"
to increase productive capacity and future output. By means of
regression analysis the relationship between levels of per capita
Income and features such as savings and investment, the rise in
taxation and government revenue and expenditure, expenditure on
education etc. They too Identify a transfer of resources from the
primary to the secondary sector, a rise in the ratio of capital stock
to the labour force and significant changes in the pattern of trade as
per capita incomes rise. Their hypothesis Is that continuous
structural change is related to the growth of income and remarkable
uniformity was found among the larger developing countries at similar
income levels. Hollis and Chenery advance four principal patterns of
resource allocation (primary specialization, balanced allocation,
Import substitution and industrial specialization).27-
Equally relevant is E Denison's monumental study as to why growth
rates differ between countries, for in the period since the Second
World War, within the league-table of high economic growth rates there
has been the fast and slow growers.
 J a Japan's unique long- term post
Second World War growth has to be contrasted with the growth rates
recorded by a very much slower growing U.S.A. and an even slower U.K.
Denison concentrates on the measurable contributions of capital,
employment, and the more efficient re-location of resources to the
growth of income. The analysis does not explain all of the differences
and raises the further question, if investment rates differ across
countries why do they differ?
The description of a process tells us little about the direction of
causation. The identification of what happens to key variables when
per capita income rises does not tell us how it is possible to
increase for example, investment, or which of the four patterns of
resource allocation, advocated by Chenery and Syrquin, would be
appropriate for any particular country. There are policy implications
for governments wishing to attain higher levels of economic growth. It
is this aspect that is the most cantraversial part of the discussion
on sources of economic growth. There is- nothing inevitable about the
growth process; choice remains at the core of the discipline of
economics.
CAUSES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: All economies function because the factors
of production: natural resources (land), accumulated wealth (capital),
and people (labour), combine to create an output for current
consumption. In a modern capitalist economy ownership may well be
divorced from production and the organization of the factors of
production, hence the addition of a fourth factor of production,
namely, entreneurship. Entrepreneurship broadly covers the skills
involved in innovating, arrangeing, structuring organizing the sequence
of production. A specific education and range of skills is required
to gether with the ability to accept and to take risks. The methods
and tools of production can be termed technology. Thus at the simplest
level economic growth is a function of useable natural resources,
active capital formation, an industrious labour force and vigorous
entreprenuership to which the best practice technological innovation
is applied. Capital incorporates the accumulated wealth of the•
society and local savings channelled into investment. Labour analysis
leads one to ask questions about the quantity of labour available, its
skills and educational capabilities, the rate of population growth,
the profile of the economically active population, the employment
opportunities that exist and the mobility of that labour force.
Natural resources covers not only agricultural production but mineral
resources and manufacturing capacity. Capital formation, the labour
force, technology, entrepreneurship , the resource base may all be
endogenous factors in the gross process that could be augmented
enlarged by additions of foreign investment, access to foreign
technology, and international trade,the latter grouped together as
exogenous factors.
The concept of "pre-conditions" for economic growth require a word of
explanation. The concept is one that has caused considerable confusion
for it appears to make the assumption that a set of factors or
arrangements must already be in place for something called "modern
economic growth" to be initiated. These factors range from an
infrastructure to the possession of appropriate knowledge and
technology, from appropriate Institutional structures to pre-existing
level of capital accumulation. The Implication is that pre-modern
growth at a rather slower pace preceeds modern growth, when there is
an acceleration in the rate of growth. This raises the debate about
continuities and discontinuities in economic growth and whether "the
great discontinuity" was the industrial revolution. Closer analysis of
pre-conditions reveal themselves to be peculiar features of a
particular economy and that for the "late-comers" to industrialization
the creation of so-called pre-conditions can become part of the
process of growth. In similar vein there have also been discussions
on the concept of "necessary but not sufficient" conditions for
economic growth but again there is not concensus on the subject.
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However, definitions explain very little about the intei—relationship
of the factors of production, whether endogenous or exogenous, the
Institutions and organizational arrangements,the structure of
government,the monetary and financial structures and the behavioural
patterns that a society creates. Nor does it explain the principle of
sustaining economic growth into the future; how society persuades its
populace to desist from current consumption in favour of larger or
more advantageous consumption in the future. Thus far more fundamental
to an understanding of the growth process is an analysis at a deeper
level of the methods and incentives that a society uses,and most
particularly South African society uses to achieve a particular rate
of economic growth. The converse of the question is a explanation of
the failures of a society to achieve a higher rate of growth ie the
failure of an economy to grow at levels experienced by other
countries, or a sudden halt and a reversal.of rapid growth. Thus
despite the industry of the economists and econometricians how much of
the growth process is measurable in the sense of determining the
"real" causes of economic growth.
The Russian experience in the 1890s is instructive. This was the
decade of the great industrial spurt, the years of forced
industrialization, and the Witte system. An annual industrial growth
rate of eight per cent was recorded. The Tsarist government actively
supported industrialization through railway construction and an arms
industry -forcing the pace of growth, successfully encouraging foreign
investment, stabilizing the rouble and introducing the gold standard,
but funded the experiinent through a broadened tax base dependent on
peasant production, exports of peasant1grain and indirect taxation.
The crisis in peasant agriculture in the early years of the 20th
century brought the Witte system to an! end, for it revealed the
instability and precarious nature of the "real" cause of growth.
 ao
This is where the contribution of the sociologist or the economist who
thinks in socilogical"constructs can make a contribution.. M.
Morishima is a Japanese economist of this type, who book, "Why did
Japan "Succeed"?" discusses the contribution of Japan's version of
Confucianism to Japanese.long-term economic "miracles".sn This
explanation perhaps comes as a surprise when one considers the
varied the carefully measured inputs that economists have studied in
an effort to explain Japanese economic "miracles" (both before and
after the Second World War). But the thesis is not an implausible one
when we contrast it with the Protestant ethic as an explanation of
north western Europe's economic performance and expansion in the early
modern period. It has become a kind of popular myth that economies
grow because of some special national trait or characteristic of
its people summed up in "the industrious Japanese", or the" thrifty
Scot" or the linking of Quaker sobriety and commercial success.
In South Africa the determination of the Afrikaner to break into
banking, mining and business circles was perhaps one of the spurs to
growth in the post-1945 period?
THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY. Let us now return to the South African scene
and look beyond the growth figures at the way in which the economy
underwent structural change after 1945. Vhat were the characteristics
of economic growth? In the first instance South Africa did indeed
experience many changes similar to the international growth patterns.
Most important was the process of industrialization, founded upon the
mining industry but with manufacturing emerging as the leading sector
during the thirties.As described, there was a relative decline in the
contribution of the agricultural sector to G D P and a steep rise in
the share of manufacturing production, exports and imports. There
remained a strong symbiotic link between the mining and manufacturing
sectors. The mining houses increasingly sought to diversify their
activities and portfolios against that seemingly inevitable exhaustion
of a finite natural resource, that could only be sold on the world
market at a fixed price C effectively the situation until 1971). But
the major bottleneck for the manufacturing sector was not capital, but
foreign exchange to finance the importation of key raw materials,
technology and equipment. Hence manufacturing countinued' to be
dependent on the mining sector to provide that vital foreign exchange.
Yet as Horwltz has pointed out the state's protective tariff policy
towards manufacturing had the effect of raising the cost structure and
hence reducing the output and income of mining and thus impacting
negatively on the manufacturing sector. Despite the chnages in the
composition of exports it was not until the seventies and more
particularly the eighties that the manufacturing sector began to
export in sizeable volumes.
Economic demands that grew out of the Second World War provided a
massive stimulus to the manufacturing sector. It was a period of
unbalanced growth as import replacement became a sudden necessity in
iron, steel and engineering. Although the value of output more than
doubled during the war there were still less than 10 000
manufacturing establishments in 1946. The industrial labour force
increased by more than 50% but perhaps the most remarkable development
was the absorption of aver 100 000 new industrial workers absorbed
during the war, who were not white.
 ;=,i- Labour in general was not a
bottleneck in the economy at this date, although particular specialist
skills were in short supply. Immigration added 90 500 to the
population between 1946 and 1949.
 fflffl By 1954/55 total employment in
manufacturing amounted to 653 000. < Census statistics, for 1951 show a
total economically active population of 4,6 million or 58,5%).
 3il
Between 1945 and 1955 the value of net output grew by amost 250%;
between 1955 and 1970 the percentage increase was 181%.as
The development of the Orange Free State goldfields together with new
developments on the Witwatersrand meant that mining was still a magnet
for investment. Despite large development funds being sunk into these
new mining ventures, the profitability of gold mining fell during the
forties in the face of inflationary pressures and a static gold price.
The 1949 devaluation of sterling, changed the picture. The
development of uranium extraction and other base minerals after 1945
was a further natural resource stimulus for economic expansion.
Similarly to capital, shortfalls in technology could be Imported.
Nattrass and Brown established in a 1973 survey of manufacturing that
73 per cent of the firms surveyed stated that 90% of the technology
they used came from abroad.
 3>i.
Over time the structure within the manufacturing sector also changed.
Increasing variety in the range of products, sophistication in the
type of product and a response to the changing demands of the consumer
were all obvious characteristics. As in the case of other
industrializing countries. South Africa also displayed the capacity
to switch from production of fairly simple consumer products (the
jams, candles, furniture and blankets range of goods) to producing
chemicals', electrical appliances, automobiles, machinery of all types
and transport equipment. There have been two principal limitations in
the growth of manufacturing. Firstly, the import-replacement
orientation of manufacturing and the nature of its tariff-regulated
cost has had an impact on the size of the market and limited component
specialization and economies of scale. Secondly, until the 1970s
capital widening took precedence over capital deependlng . The
creation of more Jobs was obviously desirable from the point of view
of spreading the benefits of industrial employment, on the other hand,
it limited productivity gains. Nonetheless, Hattrass shows that
capital deepening after 1.951 was a more pronounced feature of
investment in manufacturing than in the period 1919 to 1951. •::•,-, One
might add a third limitation to manufacturing expansion, namely, South
Africa as a late-comer to industrialization has tended tn respond to
demand for a product rather than initiate a new product in
anticipation of a local demand. This has also been a consequence of
the import-orientation of industrial policy.
Both mining and manufcturlng drew heavily on imported capital
immediately after 1945. Between 1947 and 1948 capital inflows amounted
to E681 million, as domestic savings were insufficient to finance local
investment. Up to 1954 domestic savings financed only 66 per cent of
Investment.an However between 1954 and 1982 98 per cent of domestic
liivestment was financed with domestic savings.
 s,s., The development of
specialzed financial intermediaries was important in this respect for
it creatd a market place where "savers" could be matched with
"investors". There were however considerable fluctuations in the
savings/Investment ratio. Paralleling the expanded capability of the
economy to meet its own. investment needs was a sharp rise in the
savings/income ratio, (from 0, 17 average betweem 1946 and 1957, to
0,35 in 1980.) and the investment/income ratio ( from an average of
0,23 in the 1950s , falling to a low of 0,19 in 1962, but rose to 0,35
"in 1981). Merton Dagut in the Nedbank Group appraisal of the S A
economy shows that the rise in the relative Importance of investment
occured mainly at the expense of consumre spending.no By 1972 the
value of South Africa's fixed capital stock at current prices was Just
over R38 bi 11 ion. ,.Li
What then were the major sources of domestic savings hence investment?
Statistically savings are divided into "personal savings", "corporate
savings" and the savings of "general government". Corporate savings
statistics are only available from 1953 onwards, but show a
significant rose from an initial insubstantial figure, to 10 per cent
or thereabouts in the sixties and by the eighties its contribution
amounted to about one-third of total savings, with the gold ming boom
in the seventies a significant cause of this shift. In contra"st
there has been a long-term decline in the contribution of personal
savings to total savings, from close on one-third in the sixties to a
low of 11 per cent In 1982, with South Africa recording one of the
lowest ratios of personal saving to personal disposable income £*? s
1978 United fciatlons in a list of 13 countries < along with Finland
and the U £ A.). Overall fixed investment spending by the private
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sector whilst continuing to grow (indeed its growth exceeded the
growth of real gross domestic expenditure), nonetheless showed a long
term relative decline as a proportion of total fixed investment from
1946 onwards.4i
In contrast the share of investment spending by the public sector
grew, particularly that of the public corporations during the sixties
and seventies. In 1960 public corporation investment accounted
for a mere 6,2 per cent of total fixed investment spending but by
1979 the figure was close on 25 per cent. Strategic, military
lnfrastructural and economic needs of ISCOR, SASOL, ESCOM and
ARMSCOR motivated this significant rise in expenditure. in a
developing economy state rising infrastructural expenditure is a
normal pattern, but in South Africa abnormalities crept into
the situation in the 1960s with political and strategic considrations
taking precedence over purely economic factors. During the period of
economic recession 1975 to 1979 state investment expenditure was
anti-cyclical and compensated to some extent for the drop in private
sector investment ,i3.
PEOPLE, LABOUR AND ECONOMIC GREOWTH: The obvious starting point for
a consideration of the contribution of labour to economic growth
are the basic population statistics and their composition. They
were as follows.
POPULATION STATISTICS: SIZE AND RACIAL COMPOSITION.
Blacks
Whites
Coloureds
Asians
TOTAL
1946
m
7, S
2, 4
0,9
0,3
11,4
68, 6
20, 8
8, 1
2, 5
1951
m
8, 5
2, 6
1, 1
0, 4
12,6
67, 6
20, 9
8, 7
2,9
1.960
m %
10,9
3, 1
1,5
0,5
16, 0
1970
m %
1980
68, 3
19, 3
9, 4
3, 0
15, 3
4, 5
2, 1
0, 6
21,8
70,4 30, 4
17,3 5,1
9,1 2,6
2,9 0,8
2e,6
72,2
13, 2
9, 0
2, 8
<CSource: D Hobart Houghton: The South African Economy 4th Edition 1976, p270
South Africa: An Appraisal, Johannesburg. Nedbank Group 1983, p 27)
Note: The population of the balck national states, formerly part of
South Africa have been included. " '
These statistics reveal a number of economically signficant trends
and imbalances. Firstly, in absolute terms the size of South
Africa's population < small by comparison with Western European,
Far Eastern or the U S A ) has placed constraints on the size of
the market. Secondly there is demographic diversity, such that
the Department of Statistics continues to give us a break-down of
growth rates based upon racial classification. Overall the rate of
population growth accellerated from 2,10% (1946-51), to
2,54 % C1951-60) to 2,99% <1960-70), but there were racial
differences with rate of natural increase for whites declining
from 1,8 % per annum in 1950 to below 1 per cent by 1982, whereas
black population growth began to accellerate in the 1950s and
1960s and only peaked in the late 1970s. Third notable fact was
that although whites constituted a smaller proportion of the total
population the unequal distribution of skills, educational resources
and earning power became obviously and Increasingly disproportionate.
It was not until the 1970s that shortages of skilled manpower
nr high leive 1 manpower manifested as a possible contraint on growth.
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Fourthly the high levels of population growth of the Black population
places strains upon the economy because a skewed age distribution in
favour of the young non-productive segment developed, but at the same
time increased the potential supply of labour.AA
The corollary is a potential increase in unemployment if the jobs are.
not created. Charles Simklns <1978) showed a rising unemployment
percentage for blacks from 18,3percent in 1960 to 22,4% far 1977.AB
His statistics have been questioned by Jos Gerson who aregues that
unemployment should not be confused with poverty; the policy
implication remained though a freeing of the labour market from
artificial constraints.AS
/
GROWTH AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION: South Africa has traditionally been a
identified as a country with a highly unequal distribution of income
and more so because of the racial bias in income distribution. McGrath
has shown that between 1920 and 1970 racial shares in income remained
remarkably constant with the White- share amounting to approximately 70
per cent and Blacks about 30'/.d7 Since 1970 the proportion of total
income enjoyed by Blacks has been rising; the White share of total
income which amounted to 62% in 1975 had declined to 59% by 1981.
 Aa
Racial income differences have been attributed"to educational,
and institutional manipulation; Whites have been educationally
advantaged, trade union structures have historically better protected
the White wage earner than the Black, the civil service and public
sector jobs went to Whites in preference to Blacks, jab reservation
and the colour bar placed further further restrictions on the labour
market for Blacks and artificially placed a premium on White skills
State protected jobs, superior bargargaining power and a monopoly of
high level manpower skills sums up the advantageous position of
whites which were re-inforced after 1948, between 1946 and 1970. But
closer examination of the issue and a glance again at the
international experience reveals some intractable problems.
Concentration on racial income differences obscures income
differentials within races; we are also deflected from examining
other factors and explantions of income differentials -eg income
differentials due to geographical factors or population density,
(urban/rural differentials),industry specific differentials,age and
length of employment differentials, class specific differentials, or
the competitive state of the labour market . For example, it is
impossible to compare income derived from subsistence agriculture and
income derived from employed industrial employment. In mining colour
bar differentials were compounded by the nature of the labour market
that incorporated the vast pool of foreign African unskilled job-
seekers. Kantor and Rees makes the point that not only have whites
enjoyed institutitional, educational and legal income protection but
have also enjoyed a cumulative real historical economic advantage in
earning capabilities through family culture, background and historical
circumstances.a-s Income distribution is a complex problem and it is
difficult to separate discrimination.from a host of other factors
responsible for income differentials.
Economic development is no gurantor of more equal distribution, in
fact the precise opposite. The Kuznets-Myrdal hypothesis postulated
that the processes of industrialization and urbanization lead to a
worsening of income distribution in developing countries because in
the early stages growth is concentrated in the modern sector and
there are significant factor productivity differences between
agricultural and non-agricultural activities. Chenery's calculations
confirmed this hypothesis, showing that the share of expanding GNP
15
received by the lowest 40 per cent of the income recipients declines
whereas income share of the top 20% rose during the transition phase
However it was found that as per capita income rises that trend is
reversed.so Thus the conclusion is that whilst segregation and
apartheid was responsible for some of the income differentials and
re-inforced and perpetuated those differentials over time, there were
also other factors involved.
GOVERNMENT AND GROWTH: The topic is a large one and it is not
passible to da more than to sugggest ways of thinking about the
appropriate role of government in the economy, if the goal is that of
improved well-being of the entire population. At a fundamental level
the ordering of the society by political processes creates a social
and legal environment and infrastructure which may or may not be
conducive to economic growth. There is no agreement on the most
appropriate form that the infrastructure should take and government
concern with the processes of growth is a recent one; and even when
governments talk about the importance of economic growth they are
generally have in mind the advantages likely to accrue to their
constituency. Traditionally too, the state has been ambivalent in
its interest in the economy: whether its objective ought to be with
ensuring the best possible conditions for wealth creation or whether
the state's function is to intervene with the process of distribution
and re-distribution via transfer payments.
There are certain aspects of the political structure which are almost
taken for granted in an economy. In Western capitalist economies
individual self-interest as the prime motivator in economic behaviour
underapinned original decisions about ownership and property
relationships. Past decisions about property rights, not only with
reference to the land but also in relation to company structures,
moveable property, contracts etc, and the legal framework created to
give validity and force to those relationships impinges on today's
ordering of society. The North and Thomas thesis argues that the
incentives necessary for sustained growth that had come into existence
in Western Europe by the eighteenth century, were founded on the
re-organization of efficient property rights .aver several hundred
years. Institutional changes brought about a greater co-incidence of
social and private returns to economic functioning.
 Ki Overall the
state exchanged property rights and their- protection for access to a
guaranteed steady revenue (necessary both for administration and
military purposes). It follows that differences in growth rates in
European countries is to be explained by success and'failure in
property relationships,- for example, the contrast between the
Netherlands and England on the one hand, and the Iberian peninsula on
the other.
In the nineteenth century the acceptance of limited liability, the
move from partnerships to coprorate entities and the growth of
company law simply extended property concepts. The development of
financial infrastructures relating to money, banking institutions,
share markets, insurance companies are more sophisticated varieties of
institutional property relationships and carry weight because of state
recognition of such arrangements. Hard experience, trial and error
have determined the shape of these Institutions over a lengthy period
of time.
Historically attitudes and institutions of.property relationships have
been ambivalent and strongly coloured by non-economic racial or
ethnically determined considerations. The relatively late acceptance
of private property rights in the White agricultural sector was a
retardative factor in generating output for the market. In mining too
there was ambivalence in the relationship of state and private
enterprise over ownership, mining rights and the access to the
products of mining risk and labour. There was a trade-off between
private enterprise exploitation and In exchange the acceptance of
high tax rates. But perhaps the greatest ambivalence was shown in
attitudes towards and development of appropriate institutions in the
parts of the country that became the African reserves. Leaving pre-
modern tribal institutions in place detracted from individual
incentives, discouraged a flow of investment and ensured their future
was reservoirs of one factor of production only, namely labour.
The consequences of economic neglect was spelled out forcefully in
the Tomlinson commission report but so-called remedial policies that
followed were motivated by political and not truly economic
considerations, despite Bantustans, homelands, separate development
and the national Black states. The problem of what S H Frankel
described as "the tyranny of economic paternalism" remained into the
eighties. Migrant labour and influx control were the corrolloraries
of the denial of property rights to the majority of the people. Group
Areas, Separate Amenities and Colour Bar legislation further denied
acceess to Individual ownership of property both moveable and
immoveable and prevented the most efficient return on productive
resources.
The ambivalence to property rights exaccerbated dualism, closed
markets for a free flow of all factors of production and reduced the
"openness" of the internal economy. This fundamental discrimination
meant that the state itself functioned in a duallstic fashion -with
one set of principals, guidelines, regulations and participation in
the "modern " economy, but worked within a totally different set of
assumptions, both political and economy in the "tribal" economy.
Institutional restrictions on movement, education, social structures,
property, and enterprise were anti-growth. On the other hand
state participation in the economy both directly in the provision of
politically determined modern services (transport, water services and
utilities, communications for example) and indirectly through the
parastatal public corporations (ISCOR, SASOL, ESCOM, FOSKOR SOEKOR
ARMSCOR for example) could have been both anti and pro growth. Anti-
growth in the sense that the market has.not determined the economic
viability of the activity, and reflected a commitments to self-
sufficiency in fuel, power and military hardware regardless of the
costs or international prices of such commodities, but pro-growth in
that vital lnfrastructural developments were provided, much investment
was anti-cyclical and played an increasingly important part in capital
formation. Between 1950 and 1977 the share of the public sector as a
proportion of G D P rose from just under 20% to about 22% in the
sixties, to above 25% by 1977 and 28,1% by 1979.s2
The other aspect of the state's rale in the economy revolves around
the direct and indirect regulation of the economic activities of
the private sector via fiscal policies, monetary policies, exchange
rate and interest policies, wage regulations, price and rent controls,
anti-monopoly regulation, import and export regulations and controls
etc. Over the thirty year period 1946 to 1976 state approach was
strongly interventionist and expressed a belief in the efficacy of
active regulation to achieve maximum growth rates possible and in the
desirability of economic growth. The state role was one of ironing out
fluctuations, steering the economy towards balanced economic growth
and taking responsibility for the employment of idle resources. In a
sense over this period S Africa was following an International fashion
for direct controls over the economy; but direct controls became
increasingly unfashionable after 1976 and there was a resurgence in
the belief in the market as a corrective force. On the other hand,
the state as protector of the defenceless, the channel for effecting
transfer payments, as guarantor of minimum wages may well have been
anti-growth.
SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY: The
South African economy has both benefitted from and been exposed to
greater volatility through integration into the international economy,
which in the post Second War War period bcame far more consciously
co-operative. The economy gained from the institutional arrangements
Instituted to facilitate international flows of capital and
commodities. Most particularly the establishment of a stable
international monetary system whose numeraire was a U S dollar backed
by gold, guaranteed a constant demand for a primary local commodity
whose traditonal role.in the growth process had been anti-cyclical.
The discipline imposed by a fixed international price for gold ensured
low inflation rates in the fifties but at the same time probably
limited the gains in real per capita income. Large capital outflows
from 1959 to 1963 were the result of a lack of economic confidence in
future political structures. International monetary stability though
then played a part in the restabilization of the economy from 1963
onwards and the international economic boom of the sixties rubbed off
on South Africa. In the sixties the economy tried to free itself
from the dual dependence on gold and heavy export dependency via
Import substitution policies. International currency destabilization
and the move to a floating currency system brought new challenges,
opportunities and difficulties. The fact that gold was no longer sold
abroad at a fixed price but at a market related, upwardly mobile price
created an artificial boom, strengthened the balanced of payments,
augmented capital resources via capital inflows, financed massive
state infrastructural spending in the seventies and gave us a high
rate of inflation. But private fixed investment expenditure stagnated
between 1970 and 1977 and the country did not escape the negative
effects of a trebling in the international price of oil. The rise in
the price of gold masked what was in fact a deterioration in the
terms of trade that set in from 1976.
Throughout the period (1946 -76) foreign exchange earnings were
primarily derived from mineral and agricultural exports, despite
diversification. In addition the trade/ G D P ratio remained
high ( well over 40%). In fact diversification did not go far enough
as the economy failed to exploit fully the gains that could have
accrued through trade in more sophisticated manufacturing products
in the 1970s. Capital good exports comprised only 5.3% of merchandise
exports between 1976 and 1979. Despite a switch in policy from
Inward import replacement to outward export promotion, manufacturing
exporters viewed foreign markets as stop-gaps during domestic
recessions.
 s a
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE: Here the key question revolves
around whether business cycles matter in economic growth? The magnum
opus on the business cycle in South Africa was C G Schumann's study
published in 1938; understandably It took the picture to 1936.
 E A
However after the War the business cycle became an unfashionable
topic, for with the concerted international efforts to avoid the
errors of the thirties it seemed that economics had Indeed advanced as
a science of management. The secular long term world-wide growth
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pattern of the post-war era raised questions about the validity of
cycle theories and explanations, for even when a downswing was
evident its principal characteristic was not zero or negative growth
but rather a decelleration in the rate of growth. Most countries,
including South Africa were swayed by the plausability of the argument
that employment creation should take precedence over monetary
stability and by the sixties it was the accepted doctrine that a
little inflation and law unemployment was palatable and would not
damage growth prospects. For South Africa it was a rather more
complex situation but it did appear that the economy was in any event
protected by gold, which traditionally behaved in an anti-cyclical
manner. But the consistently high level of export dependence,
referred to above,and the apparent openness of the economy to
exogenous forces, did indeed cause international cycles to impact on S
Africa, albeit following a time lag. This raises the issue of
"export-led growth". It has been argued that cyclical upswings
followed a rise in export earnings (because of the heavy export
dependence) from which all good things could then flow. But after a
period of easy money bottlenecks in supply showed an overheating.
Conversely, a reversal of demand from abroad had the effect of
inducing an export-led recession. During the seventies gold ceased to
behave in an anti-cyclical manner, as the open non-monetary market
took precedence over monetary demand in setting the price of the
metal. Hence in recent years cycles have become far more pronounced.ss
PRO-GROVTH FACTORS IN THE S A ECONOMY: In summary the principal
pro-growth factors during the period were property concepts, business
structures and the existence of an open market. The growth of capital
investment, the expansion of the manufacturing sector, and the growth
•f the domestic market were all growth stimulants. Heavy fixed
investment in the infrastructure in the past, reduced transport costs
and contributed to a widelng of the market encouraging greater
specialization. Capital supply was not a factor limited growth as
domestic savings were augmented by access to foreign capital markets.
Similarly there was no constraint imposed by a limited supply of
entrepreneurs.However It would seem that since 1976 skill shortages
and political restrictions in the importation of such skills from
overseas and sanctions contraints on overases capital investment
has raised the price of investment and hence raised the returns on
investment necessary to induce that movement of factors of production.
Net annual immigration levels of between 30 000 and 40 000 between
1963 and 1975 reverse to negative flaws of emigrants in 1977 and
1978.
 E 6 Institutionally the state has both promoted economic growth
and restricted the growth potential , creating the conditions for the
free circulation of the factors of production, guaranteeing property
and legal rights, pursuing sophisticated monetary and fiscal policies
but at the same time in as much as apartheid restricted the flow of
the factors of production, introduced artificial restraints on entry
into specific occupations. Race conscious attitudes towards education
and employment restricted the growth potential. Productivity increases
played a relatively minor role in growth. In other words, measurable
increased factor inputs rather than productivity. Educational
attainments were an obvious constraint on growth in general and
productivity in particular; illiteracy, semi-literacy, the skewing of
enrolment in favour of the first four primary classes, poorly
qualified teachers and massive discrepancies in the levels of
expenditure of white and black education had severe consequences for
growth potential. Population growth and urbanisation expanded the
market but the growth of unemployment and higher dependency ratios
restricted the productive capacity of the economy. Income inequality
persisted and average earnings of White workers generally increased
faster than the earnings of Black workers until 1972, but from 1973
onwards the position changed with income differentials for employed
workers narrowing on a racial basis.s7 Low levels of inflation was
accepted as being pro-growth in the 1960s, being regarded as the pricf
to be paid for higher levels of employment; however in the 1970s as
inflation rates rose to double-figures it was noted that too high
rates of inflation had a negative effect on growth. The balance of
payments during the 1960s and early 1970s (apart from the politically
motivated capital flight of the early sixties) did not place M
contraints on growth until the mid-1970s. The current account was not
the problem during the 1970s but the capital account began to reflect
the changes in the political perceptions of S Africa's future by
foreign investors.The decline in the gold reserves had a negative
impact on the growth rate and capital outflows dampened the likely
positive effects of rising exports.
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES: During the period under consideration there
was no unanimity about appropriate development stragegies. South Afri>.
remained a capitalist orientated mixed economy with conspicuous
anomalies in property relationships and ownership of the factors of
production. Some critics have argued that. commitment to and
ennunciation of a pro—growth policy was no more than rhetoric, because
first principles remain an unequal institutional structure with
limited access for all to the factors of production. Nonetheless
policy directions can be guaged from the type of economic commissslons:
and investigastions established by the state and the recommendations
that fallowed. The Tomlinson commission of 1954 showed an awareness oi
the perilous state of the reserves and recommended a complete
restructuring of the reserve economy. In 1958 the Vlljoen Commission
on the protection of industries stressed import substitution in its
recommendations. The 1972 Reynders Commission reversed this position
and argued for export replacement. The Kleu report on appropriate
industrial strategy published in 1982 recommended that development
strategies and technologies should be in line with the country's
resource endowments and emphasised the integrated nature of the
Southern African economy. Development legislation and strategies have
not always ca-incided with the recommendations of official
recommendations of committees and commissions. The 1960 Statement o:
the Establishment of Industries In Border Areas demarcated the
-geographical location of capital minimising the role of the market in
determining the efficiency of capital. The 1967 Physical Planning
Act was anti-growth in as much as it restricted development in
natural growth areas but did nothing to encourage growth in the
decentralised areas. By the end of the seventies the failure of a
development strategy tied to political considerations had become
evident. Readiness to adapt and change was shown in the incorporation
of a new development scheme in 1980. The 1979 Riekert Commission
report marked a clear break with the past in recommending the
greater mobility for labourers but mobility linked to employment and
accommodation. As we all know this was death-knell for influx
control.
FUNDAMENTAL DISPUTES: Perhaps the literature on economic growth has
clearly generated more heat than light! Whilst there might be
substantial agreement on the statistics of growth and the rates
achieved in the past, there is no consensus on the causes or sources
of growth, despite comparisons with international data..There is no
certainty that the rates of growth achieved in the past were the
maximum possible rates of growth; nor can we replay the past as a
scientific experiment with a controlled and a variable model.
It might be helpful, particularly with a view to a wider discussion of
future policy directions, to identify the areas and issues that are
in dispute.
The first point to be made is that there is debate about the co-
incidence of private and social returns and private and social costs
of an economic activity. In any economic activity there may well be a
divergence of private and social costs where a marginal gain to the
individual- may result in a marginal loss to the community. Individual
self-interest may result in short term gains but long-term losses. Do
individual property ownership rights equalise private and social rates
of return? If individual property ownership does result in output
increases and hence economic growth, how should the individual be
persuaded not to raise social costs? Perhaps even more fundamental
is the question of human motivation in the economic sphere. Do
individuals act rationally being motivated by self-interest, with a
certain action being pursued only the likely gains exceed the costs?
Or are class interests stronger than individual interests; on balance
are individuals more likely to act in concert or in competitition with
one another? Can the dispute be resolved by creating a system which
places at its core the individual or one which emphasises communal
Identity?
There is no agreement about appropriate political and economic
structures and about the relationship of these structures or
intitutions. The intei—relatedness of socio-political and economic
structures raises questions about causal directions of change. Do
political structures take primacy and determine the nature of the
economy or do fundamental changes in the economy provide the leverage
for aspiring, emerging groups to challenge and unseat the potentially
declining but dominant group or groups? Economic growth will occur
only when the participants in the economy a provided with the
political and economic incentives to realise their potential.
In the South African context this debate has been subsumed under
the terms of race vs class. Is this breakdown of relationships into
class and /or race an appropriate one in the sphere of economic
growth? Economic analysis in S Africa has tended to be constrained
by racial stereotypes, this being the format of so many statistical
tables. But class analysis based upon income or education might be a
more satisfactory framework for understanding economic growth.
Capitalist and socialist based analyses of the growth process
in South Africa diverge in their account of why and how growth took
place. Ifeo-Marxist analysis sees South Africa as an example of
capitalist development, with race.subservient to class and the process
of growth re-inforclng white supremacy. The liberal Interpretation
stresses the dysfunctionality of racial discrimation enforced by the
polity and economic growth, arguing that the rising costs of growth
would lead to a challenge of the racial structure.
A thought-provoking contribution to this debate was the now renowned
essay by Herbert Blumer the logic of industrialization in a racial
context.^.© He postulated that industrialization could accommodate
itself to the racial order. But the concept of "the logic of
industrialization" has been challenged and historical evidence
elsewhere points to the variety in the format and direction of
industrialization and in the consequent response of the social and
political order. Perhaps what is at issue is not race but the extent
to which South Africa responded to the challenges of growth and
21
industrialization in other ways (ability to make rational changes, a
secular outlook, contractual and property relationships, the openness
of the market and factor mobility. )
The importance of a national identity or character based upon a common
religion, cultural heritage or language has also been debated and has
been mentioned briefly in this paper. The .emphasis on consensus
politics expresses a vague awareness of the psychological importance
of unity. But the fact remains that South Africa is best by
disparities and differences in every respect thus the challenge
remains to achieve economic growth depite this diversity and in the
process create a co-operative identity, which is perhaps an almost
impossible goal.
One path to identity would be through a single educational system
with some commonly defined goals. But during the period discussed
educational divisions became more pronounced, vast differences in
approach and resource allocation remained and cultural identity of
groups took precedence over the requirements of the economy.
Within education there is the dispute about the appropriate format of
a system to achieve maximum growth rates: elitist or generalist.
Should South Africa opt for a broadbased literacy programme which
places the greater part of resources into four of six years of primary
schooling or should an early streaming of ability and talent take
place leading to highly elitist narrow system. At present we appear
to fall between the two approaches and falling in both.
Education has considerable implications for rapid economic growth.
Here the debate hinges on capital deepening/capital widening issue.
Should the growth goal to create more jobs for more people (expand
inputs) or should emphasis fall rather on raising the productivity of
people currently employed (investment in capital equipment to make
each worker more productive)?
Paralleling this discussion is the debate about resource allocation
and income distribution. Should more equitable income distribution
take precedence over concentrations of savings in fewer hands?
South Africa's economy is characteristed by concentrations of capital
and ownership by oligopolies( the insurance companies, the mining
houses, the banks, the pension funds). Concentrations of wealth
income, purchasing power and the monopsonistic behavior in purchasing
labour has itself restricted and contrained the" market and limited
competition. Is this desirable or undesirable for economic growth and
what are the future policy implications of this situation? The choice
reduces to one between concentrations of income in the hands of
corporations or individuals with a high propensity to save and hence
invest or alternatively an attempt to expand the market by broadening
the consumption base.
Economic dualism is another keenly debated question. Dualism was
originally said to eixst when two seeming insulated sectors of the
economy, a pre-modern subsistence agricultural sector and a modern
manufacturing/industrial sector develop a symbiotic relationship in .
whih the industrial sector is able to maintain its growth rate because
it is able to draw on the agricultural sector for labour. Essentially
the discussion is about the terras of trade between the two sectors and
whilst orthodox economists view the relationship as a transitory one
whereby the very nature of the development process will change the
relationship between the two sectors. The "underdevelopment thesis"
holds that the capitalist core economy entrenches its position and
grows because it is able to manipulate a regeneration of labour
supplies from the subsistence sector, maintaining the terms of trade
in its favour. Both theories are open to the criticism that too heavy
an emphasis is being placed an labour as "the" key factor of
production and the assumption of relative isolation of the two
sectors. It has been noted that dualism has been a characteristic of
other economies. For example in Japan an initial nineteenth century
dualism between sectors, became by the intei—war period an intra-
indusrtrial dualism. It has been argued that this very different
type of dualism has been a factor in post-war economic growth as it
was possible for resources to be transferred from the small
company,lower cast, component manufacturing sector during period of
rapid expansion but that this sector then bore the brunt of recession
and contraction, insulating the large-company, higher cost corporate
sector. This variation of the dualism model has been applied to the
possible relationship between the formal and informal sector in South
Africa with signficant policy implications.
Balanced versus unbalanced growth is contentious because it is
difficult to provide "proof" as to the "best" path to growth. In an
ideal world balanced and even rates of growth is likely ta give the
smoothest ride to the economy. But historically the long—run growth
path has been characterised by imbalance or as de Kiewiet put it
economic advancement happened by "windfalls". Expansionary spurts
often induced by exogenous factors, have be followed by sharp
contracts. Business cycle theory, referred to above describes the
experience of wave-like growth. It has been postulated, to use Japan
once again as a comparative example, that unbalanced growth and the
long-swing pattern of investment is a plausible expalanation of the
rapidity of that country's growth rate.
The international dimension is important because debate surrounds the .
advantages and disadvantages of being an "open" economy. Because of
the heavy dependence on one export commodity, namely gold, the economy
has traditionally been exposed to international economic currents and
vicisltudes. Exchange rates, capital flows, trade balances, foreign
exchange and gold reserves have all been highly volatile through this
international dependency. On the other hand gains from trade and
participation in the international economy have also been pro-growth.
Debate though centres on the appropriate degree of integration into
the world economy and whether it is possible to regulate that
participation. In the sixties, the arms embargo initiated a-process -
of military and strategic self-sufficiency, with mixed consequences
for economic growth. Debate has followed too on impart -replacement
vs export promotion, which had obvious implications for development
strategies.
CONCLUSIONS: The determination of the sources of economic growth in
the S A economy as opposed to evidence of its manifestation is as
complex here as it is in other economies. It is not possible to
know with any certainty whatever that the growth rate attained was
the highest possible. What we have in abundance is evidence of
racial discrimination and we also have evidence that economic growth
took place at different rates in different time periods. It is a much
more complex problem to prove that economic growth was a consequence
of discrimination or alternatively that economic growth was
incompatible with racial discrimination. Government it is evident
intervened in different sectors of the economy in totally
contradictory ways; with ambivalent attitudes being expressed in
opposing policies. Stated support for free enterprise and belief in
the efficacy of the market was not always implemented. Ferhaps most
fundamental of all were differing assumptions about property
relationships. Any future government of South Africa will be faced
with the challenge of re-defining property relationships. The key
issue ought to be the attainment of maximum economic growth in
anticipation that this goal will at the same time will result in
rising per capita incomes and if not an equal distribution of output
at least a situation where the next generation will be materially
better off than the generation surveyed in this paper. Perhaps this
requires too great a leap in faith for the new breed of politicians
and the reality will be an on-going debate about wealth creation
versus wealth distribution.
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